03415cam a2200661 4500
1928
1928
482015845
DE-627
20210426164326.0
tu
050318s2004 xxu||||| 00| ||eng c
9780262134170
: hc. : alk. paper
0262633086
(pb)
0262134179
hc. : alk. paper
9780262633086
: pb.
9780262633086
(DE-627)482015845
(DE-576)114576203
(DE-599)GBV482015845
(OCoLC)254141765
(OCoLC)254141765
(OCoLC)611669076
(OCoLC)1033903958
(AT-OBV)AC04635660
DE-627
ger
DE-627
rakwb
eng
XD-US
XA-GB
QP411
153
1
ssgn
CC 5500
rvk
CC 4400
rvk
77.50
bkl
08.36
bkl
17.30
bkl
a
Metzinger, Thomas
1958-
(DE-588)121599353
(DE-627)081413386
(DE-576)163802246
aut
Being no one
the self-model theory of subjectivity
Thomas Metzinger
1. paperback ed.
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
2004
XII, 699 S.
Ill., graph. Darst.
23 cm
Text
txt
rdacontent
ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen
n
rdamedia
Band
nc
rdacarrier
A Bradford book
Includes bibliographical references (p. [635]-662) and index
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analysed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Consciousness
Cognitive neuroscience
Self psychology
BO
http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/01858PTS5VL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA198_SH20_OU03_.jpg
Cover
Cover
CC 5500
CC 4400
77.50
08.36
17.30
z
0
0
z
0
0
KRIT
KRIT
2021-04-26
2021-04-26
2021-04-26