000			03415cam a2200661 4500
999			_c1928 _d1928
001			482015845
003			DE-627
005			20210426164326.0
007			tu
008			050318s2004 xxu||||| 00| ||eng c
020			_a9780262134170 _c : hc. : alk. paper
020			_a0262633086 _c(pb)
020			_a0262134179 _chc. : alk. paper
020			_a9780262633086 _c : pb.
024	3		_a9780262633086
035			_a(DE-627)482015845
035			_a(DE-576)114576203
035			_a(DE-599)GBV482015845
035			_a(OCoLC)254141765
035			_a(OCoLC)254141765
035			_a(OCoLC)611669076
035			_a(OCoLC)1033903958
035			_a(AT-OBV)AC04635660
040			_aDE-627 _bger _cDE-627 _erakwb
041			_aeng
044			_cXD-US _cXA-GB
050		0	_aQP411
082	0		_a153
084			_a1 _2ssgn
084			_aCC 5500 _2rvk
084			_aCC 4400 _2rvk
084			_a77.50 _2bkl
084			_a08.36 _2bkl
084			_a17.30 _2bkl
090			_aa
100	1		_aMetzinger, Thomas _d1958- _0(DE-588)121599353 _0(DE-627)081413386 _0(DE-576)163802246 _4aut
245	1	0	_aBeing no one _bthe self-model theory of subjectivity _cThomas Metzinger
250			_a1. paperback ed.
264		1	_aCambridge, Mass. [u.a.] _bMIT Press _c2004
300			_aXII, 699 S. _bIll., graph. Darst. _c23 cm
336			_aText _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aBand _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aA Bradford book
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [635]-662) and index
520			_aAccording to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analysed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
650		0	_aConsciousness
650		0	_aCognitive neuroscience
650		0	_aSelf psychology
951			_aBO
856	4	2	_uhttp://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/01858PTS5VL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA198_SH20_OU03_.jpg _yCover _3Cover
936	r	v	_aCC 5500
936	r	v	_aCC 4400
936	b	k	_a77.50
936	b	k	_a08.36
936	b	k	_a17.30
942			_2z